

1391
T H O U G H T S

ON A

L E T T E R,

ADDRESSED TO THE

RIGHT HON. THOMAS CONOLLY,

AS

S E C R E T A R Y

TO THE

W H I G C L U B.

BY A WHIG. *K.*

D U B L I N :

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1790.

THOUGHTS

ON A

LETTER, &c.

IT was very natural to expect, that an Institution formed on the principles of the WHIG CLUB, in this Country, should raise an alarm in Government, and call forth some Writer to defame its true spirit and design.—The illustrious names to be found in this Association—the important ends which it professes to attain—the rapid growth of its influence and strength—and the danger to be apprehended by Government, from a general diffusion of its sentiments through the nation, deservedly render it an object of expectation to some, and of terror to others.

A *liberal* public appeal, therefore, on the part of a MINISTERIAL WRITER, however it may surprise, could not displease any real friend to its principles. At the same time it is somewhat difficult to suppress all indignation, when a Writer presumes, under the sanction of Government, to cast indecent personal reflections upon Men of the highest rank and honour. Neglecting, however, all such, and consigning them to a merited contempt, I shall bestow a few thoughts upon the public matter of HIS LETTER—and I hope not only to satisfy every candid mind upon the

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subject, but also to point out some doctrines advanced by him, as having a direct tendency to the ruin of this kingdom.

The general idea, which prevails through the whole Letter, is, that the Whig Club is a mere instrument in the hands of an English party. I shall say nothing of the whimsical situation of the Writer, who himself seems to be so strongly infected with the spirit of party, that almost his entire Pamphlet is an attempt to satirize Mr. Fox, and to commend Lord Buckingham's administration. But I will maintain his charge to be, in this respect, a gross misrepresentation.

It is true, that in the preamble, and incidentally, in the body of the Resolutions of the Whig Club, mention is made of two distinct parties in England, and a decided preference given to one above the other. But it is equally true, that attachment to that party is neither their primary object, nor ultimate design. It may possibly be asked, why then is any allusion whatsoever made to English party? Cannot the affairs of Ireland be carried on wholly independent of such considerations? I fairly answer that in my opinion, situated as the two Countries are, under one common Government—they cannot. Unquestionably, the principles of the ruling party in England must, in the present relation of the two Countries, find their way into this kingdom, and direct the administration of affairs here. And, if so, surely it becomes the duty of every good subject of Ireland as well as of England, to examine well those principles; that, if they should accord with his own, he may support that Government, otherwise that he may give it his opposition. The same reasoning will apply to a party in this Country, if any party be admissible,—which question I shall take occasion to examine. In the mean time I wish to rectify the Writer's mistake, which seems to originate

originate in a confusion of ideas, if not in a wilful perversion of understanding. The Whig Club profess an attachment to one party above the other, and unequivocally assign these reasons, viz. That under their power, and with their concurrence, our liberties were restored, that their principles are congenial to those of the Whig Club, and that their fair and liberal conduct is more deserving of public confidence than the insidious arts of the other. Neither have they been content with laying down general grounds of attachment to that party, but have likewise set forth particularly what these grounds are; thereby pledging themselves to certain important national objects, and not to the future conduct of an English party. The Writer will perhaps call these resolutions and declarations—the echo of Mr. Fox's sentiments. I know not whence the framers of them might have taken their ideas—but if they have drawn them from this source, I am persuaded the People of Ireland, will so far at least, adopt the sentiments of that Statesman.

I cannot help thinking, that, even without all this caution on their part, the improbability of the writer's assertion is too glaring to find the least credit. Can it be supposed that the great Assertors of Irish Independence, whose talents, integrity and spirit have raised their Country from a state of vassalage to a proud equality among the nations of the earth, should become puppets in the hands of any man? forgetful of their dignity, their honour and their nobly-acquired fame—regardless of those grand objects which have employed their public life, and surrendering themselves into the hands of a Party in that kingdom, from whose oppressive yoke they have relieved this. These things cannot be—no man retaining the least sense of virtue, or integrity of judgment can believe them.

But, that I may not be thought to rest the cause upon the authority of those great names, I shall now examine its merits.

The subject naturally resolves itself into the two following questions : 1st.—Whether Party be, under any circumstances or any qualifications admissible into this Country, and 2dly. Supposing this to be made out, how far the Whig Club may lay claim to public confidence upon those grounds,—under this second part of the division I shall principally be concerned with the arguments and opinions of the Writer.

With respect to the first point, I humbly conceive, that Party is not only admissible upon certain terms, but absolutely necessary to the safety and welfare of the Country.—Let me not here be understood to mean by Party, a combination of powerful family interests, formed with a view to aggrandize themselves and extend the sphere of their influence. No man is more ready than I am, to admit the evils attendant upon an Irish Aristocracy ; which, instead of watching over the conduct of Administration, and opposing all encroachments upon the Rights of the People, is apt to usurp the Government into its own hands, and to render the concerns of the state subservient to its ambitious designs. The country already suffered too long under such a party ; and I trust in God, is at length grown too strong and enlightened for any further experiment. For certainly in proportion as the great mass of the people acquire importance under a settled Constitution and enlarged Commerce, there is less danger to be apprehended from an influence of this nature.

But while I condemn party, formed upon personal, private or family motives, I own myself a zealous advocate for Party upon principle—by which I mean, an association of men, avowedly united, upon certain leading sentiments of public utility—I am aware that such an idea might appear utterly wild and

and inconceivable to the Writer : and I am also sensible, that many wise and virtuous men will be ready to express their fears, lest some Members might enter into the society without any public motive whatsoever. To these, with great deference, I answer, that, allowing the objection its whole force, such an Institution as we are now speaking of, must still be of vast benefit, in superadding, clearly and unequivocally, the obligations of private honour to those of public virtue. There are many men, who would laugh at a charge of inconsistency, however well founded, in their parliamentary conduct; who yet would tremble at the thought of violating a declaration, to which they had subscribed their names. If the love of our Country be for the most part too weak a spring of action, and men cannot be induced from motives perfectly pure and disinterested to serve the Commonwealth, is it the part of a firm and good Citizen to despair? No, he will take human nature as he finds it, and employ every fair and honourable means to attain the great and good end which he has in view—he will engage the virtues and feelings of the private gentleman in the public cause—and will direct his ambition into that course, which may be at once most profitable to the individual, and most useful to the state.

Quoniam autem vivitur non cum perfectis hominibus pleneque sapientibus, præclare agitur, si sint simulacra virtutis.

This reasoning I acknowledge would not apply to a society of men actuated by those different motives, unless they were mutually obliged to go hand in hand towards the attainment of great national objects, and forbidden by a sacred pledge of honour from turning aside from the public course into the devious paths of private interest. Without this common obligation and common end, such a mixture would be very heterogeneous indeed : whereas under the direction of great controuling principles
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these discordant elements might work together for good, and the result be harmony and strength.

In the next place, Party upon principle appears to me the best means of giving efficacy to the law of Reputation, a law, which duly executed, has a vast influence in the conduct of life.—Whilst every man is left at large to act for himself in public affairs, great latitude of conduct is taken, and great indulgence expected. The most corrupt characters relying on the secrecy of their designs, put on the face and assume the language of honest men. Nay more, there are many men, who are known to ridicule every idea of public virtue, with almost a total impunity from this law: because, no individual has sufficient authority for its enforcement, even against the most atrocious delinquent. And this evil is the greater in the present case; because, they, whose opinions should, from their stations, have most weight, are themselves in some measure parties, and, should they make a false step, may hope for a liberal indulgence in their turn.

Hanc veniam damus, petimusque vicissim.

Whereas, Party, not confined to parliamentary characters alone, but embracing every Citizen distinguished for virtue or talents, will serve as a controul both over its own members and others. There will always be found some honest and spirited men in such a society, whose united support will encourage virtue and appal corruption. To oppose singly a general depravity of morals, and shew a marked discountenance to every public knave, however highly respectable this solitary virtue may be, would be a task as useless as invidious. But a number of congenial minds, actuated by a spirit of public as well as private honour, uniting their judgments, become a formidable tribunal, and whilst with a conscious integrity of their own designs, they challenge public observation, they will not fail to
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pass a just and impartial sentence upon the conduct of others.

I do further maintain, that in this country opposition to a corrupt Government cannot rest upon any firm and solid ground, but such a Party as I now speak of.—Government having the entire disposal of all emoluments and honours of the State, is thereby enabled to acquire vast strength and power in the legislative assemblies.—A mutual compact, either open or implied, is settled between the Minister and the Placeman—the support of the Government is the condition of tenure. Supposing then, that by accident a certain measure should become a favourite object with the Minister, the immediate operation of which, might openly strike at our liberties, or (which is even more to be dreaded) whose silent progress might sap and waste the Constitution ; and that he should unluckily meet with some obstinate Placeman, who refused to set his hand to the work, how stands the case, where there is no bond of union ? Why the Minister can instantly punish this base ingratitude. He need only look round, among those independent labourers, for some more willing and sturdy fellow, who is perhaps, the bosom friend of the sulky dog so deservedly dismissed, and who from his intimate knowledge of him is the better enabled to lay before the Master his own superior qualifications, There is a great advantage in this—the business of Government goes on smoothly, and the principle of corruption is by these delicate transitions preserved in a gentle and salutary motion. But to be serious : One of the greatest misfortunes of this country is the evil here alluded to. Hence, those dark and petty intrigues which so much dishonour us—hence, our mutual suspicions—hence, the want of all assurance of support to the patriotic mind—hence, that mean spirit of seizing upon the moment of present advantage, and the miserable triumph
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of over-reaching a competitor. In short, the character of the nation appears to me as much degraded as its interests are affected by these proceedings—and, as a remedy for them, I have long wished for a *Party upon principle*, which may effectually stop all these secret machinations, and give the runners of Government eternal repose.

If it be said, that power and not the public good is the true object with the majority of such a Party: Even admitting this, I say, it must surely be of great advantage, to have any body of men, who are coming into power, pledged to certain great national principles. Nor can I suppose, whatever might possibly be the conduct of a few individuals, that such a party would be vile and audacious enough either to elude or violate their clear and solemn engagements. And were this possible, what would be the consequence? Every man of the least pretension to character must desert them, and they would for ever lose all claim to public confidence; without which it is impossible, as I shall presently shew, for such a party to sustain itself.

Among all the advantages attending party upon principle, the most excellent yet remains behind; I mean, the consequence and dignity which from its nature it must add to the People. This indeed I conceive as paramount to all the rest, because certainly no nation can be truly free, whatever be its laws and constitution, until the people have learned to pay due attention to, and take their constitutional part in public affairs. Now, I say such a party, as I contend for, has the most immediate reference to this grand object. For its very fundamental act is an Appeal to the People;—the principles upon which it is framed, and which are to serve as rules for its public conduct, are submitted to the People;—the People therefore are in possession of a lasting test, by which the party consents to abide. If the resolutions and sentiments of the party should accord with
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those of the people, so far it would claim their support—and while it adhered steadily to these principles, it would expect a continuance of that support, founded on tried conduct. Should either condition fail, it can hope for nothing.—By the people, therefore, must it stand or fall.

I know it will be objected that such a party will court the People merely for the purpose of obtaining power.

Now, supposing this to be the case, it shews at least, in what a light such a party holds the people, when it is thought necessary to make an appeal to them for the rectitude of its intentions in the first instance—and nothing can more strongly prove a sense of its obligation to adopt those measures, which may secure their lasting confidence and esteem.—The objection is in my opinion supported by a false analogy.—Cases, I own, might be urged, in which even after very solemn protestations of some men, the public hopes have been greatly disappointed.—Yet it should be considered, that a breach of any positive and explicit engagement has been the act of only a very few individuals; and where it has been brought home to any man, it has affixed to his character a lasting disgrace.

There are few public men, who do not in some degree qualify those rash engagements; and even if they do not, the evidence against them is supposed to pass away. But in the case now before us matters are quite otherwise—here is the deliberate act of a body of men, pledging themselves to certain principles, and certain measures, the evidence of which remains for ever. Such a party, if it possessed the least wisdom, could never slight the sentiments of the people. After having acknowledged their dignity in its own original act, and made them the judges of its own principles; to forget them in the day of power, would be not merely the basest ingra-

titude; but most extreme folly. I shall congratulate my Country, when the Aristocracy must owe its elevation to public confidence and esteem.

Upon the whole; Party upon principle, seems to be attended with a multitude of most important advantages to this Country. It not only unites the forces of truly public-spirited men, but also engages on the same side, the sentiments of private honour, and even gives to interested and ambitious views a just direction.—It excites a sensibility to character, and establishes an awful tribunal of judgment over public conduct.—It takes away all petty negotiations, and dark intrigues, introducing in their stead an open and liberal system of politics;—and it appeals to the Majesty of the People; and grounds every hope of success upon their confidence and approbation.

But the second question to be examined, is, how far the Whig Club in this kingdom merits the title of such a Party.

A good deal has been already offered in proof of this point, through the general course of the argument, which, I doubt not, the reader has applied. The grounds of the institution there stated, are those which induced the Author of these THOUGHTS to enroll himself among its members; and he knows them to be the settled opinions of a great number beside himself. If the characters of its Members be looked into, many will be found incapable of condescending to act a part in public life, but upon motives of public honour.—These men, who, by their rank, their abilities, and, above all, by their integrity and public services, command an extensive and well-grounded popularity, must retain a vast influence, and act as a body of controul in the society. They, are the great securities of the people, and guardians of the Institution.—From them, the people will not only expect, with full assurance,

assurance, an upright adherence to their avowed principles, but, a watchful eye, over the conduct of others, whose public virtue might be more suspected.

But the Writer overlooks all considerations of this kind, and charges every man, who has subscribed the Resolutions of the Whig Club, with an adoption of principles and doctrines, which are enough to vitiate his whole public character. Although, a great deal of his matter is utterly foreign to its Resolutions and Declarations; yet, that I may not be thought to pass over any thing, I shall follow him strictly in his own method.

He begins with the preamble; in signing which, the Whig Club has, according to him, “declared its sincere conviction and assurance of the following assertions.”

“First, That an administration formed under Mr. Pitt is more dangerous to Ireland than a government deriving under Mr. Fox.

“Second, That Mr. Fox in conceding the right of external legislation to Ireland, concurred in the principle of that concession.

“Third, That they approve the principles of Mr. Fox and his associates because they are their own.

“Fourth, That Mr. Pitt, and his administration, have not only insidiously endeavoured to infringe our renovated constitution, but that, besides many alarming circumstances they clearly perceive a settled and premeditated plan to sap the liberties of Ireland.

“Fifth, That, to overwhelm Ireland with expenses and consequent debt, is the way to effect the horrid purpose.

From this circumstantial division, I expected a full and distinct argument upon each point; but the First Proposition, which indeed is the most important

and fundamental of the whole, he has not thought proper to touch, upon its own merits, but has involved all consideration of it under the Third.

This appears to me not very candid, because in discussing the Third Point, he takes in a variety of matter with which the Whig Club has very little concern; and he draws away our attention from the main subject of the first, which is one of the principal grounds contained in the preamble. He will give me leave, therefore, to examine his own proposition with a little more attention.

But, first, let me take notice of one remark, which the Writer has subjoined to his series of propositions; it is of so whimsical and amusing a kind, that I have never read it without a mixture of entertainment and surprize. "If these assertions were "true," says he, "Mr. Pitt, and any Government "appointed by his influence, ought not to be opposed by resolutions, but with arms!" A very summary process truly! Why this is the very knight-errantry of politics--the Giant of the Castle must instantly be assailed, and the poor damsel IERNE rescued from his hands--all parley would be disgraceful! It is difficult to be grave upon this subject;--so strange and irregular a fally of patriotic zeal is evidently the absurd ranting of a poor player. However, I am not displeased with his insincerity, and am only ashamed that any Writer, who attempts a constitutional question, should betray an ignorance of the plainest matters.--To sound the trumpet and raise the standard of Resistance, surely is admissible only in cases of the last necessity, and most pressing danger, where the usual forms of parliamentary wisdom fail; but in the situation alluded to, "of a settled and premeditated plan to sap the "liberties of Ireland, by overwhelming her with "expences and consequent debt, in order to the "mere use of an unconstitutional influence in her "Parliament,"

“Parliament;” nothing but the wildest and most romantic spirit of political chivalry, could urge the propriety of an immediate recourse to arms. The slow operation of this evil is peculiarly adapted to the solemn deliberations of Parliament;—and it is one of those cases, where the People cannot possibly form any settled judgment without a full parliamentary discussion. Never was man more unlucky in laying a ground of rebellion;—had such a sentiment come from any one but a Court-Writer, he might be accused, and not without reason, of a most dangerous spirit of sedition.

I come now to examine his first Proposition; and do maintain, “that an Administration formed under “Mr. Pitt, is more dangerous to Ireland, than a “government deriving under Mr. Fox.”

In deciding this question, I think we have no concern with the principles of either Statesman, farther than they relate to Ireland;—and it is in this view certainly every Member of the Whig Club subscribes his Declaration. I say this, however, by no means conceding to the Writer, that the principles of Mr. Fox, in English politics, are such as he would state them;—and if the more immediate purpose of this Pamphlet will allow me, I shall not decline a comparison of these with Mr. Pitt’s. But the question, in which the Whig Club are engaged, solely relates to their principles and conduct towards this country.

The ground of our attachment then to Mr. Fox’s ministry is simply this, “that under their power, and “with their concurrence, our Rights were restored “to us”—and, “we apprehended more danger from “Mr. Pitt’s administration, which has already infidiously attempted to infringe them.” The former of these positions is a fact, which the Writer was unable to deny, and therefore in order to do away its merit he resorts to “the principle of Mr. Fox, in
“conceding

“conceding the Rights of external legislation to Ireland.” Now, I ask, was Mr. Fox singular in his assertion of British supremacy in matters of external legislation? Or was it not the universal sentiment of Englishmen? So far as I have been able to learn, Mr. Pitt never thought otherwise—at least in all the debates upon Irish affairs, he never advanced an idea of an opposite tendency. The accusation is therefore most uncandidly salted upon Mr. Fox—and, whatever opinion we entertain of this principle in the mind of an Englishman, they must both stand or fall together. So far then, no comparative objection lies against Mr. Fox. Let us now examine the *conduct* of each towards Ireland, with respect to her Rights and Constitution.

It is true, that her noble acquirements were primarily and chiefly owing to her own strength and spirit. By a providential concurrence of events, she was called forth into exertion, and animated through every part with the soul of Liberty. Yet surely, the concession of Independence without contest, was the part of a great and good Statesman; and I doubt not, is felt with acknowledgment by every friend of peace. A proud and imperious, or a dark and revengeful spirit might have probably made it a question of force—and, whatever had been the event, Ireland must have lost much of her best blood. It was fortunate therefore, for this country, that a man of a bold and generous mind, capable at once of discerning the just consequences of things, and of encountering the rooted prejudices of a nation, should in that critical situation of affairs, preside at the helm. He had the magnanimity, fairly and fully to restore our Rights. Compare this with the conduct of Mr. Pitt, who lays a deep and insidious scheme, under the fallacious hope of commercial advantages, to steal away our constitution. This single transaction towards Ireland most strikingly displays the

the character of both Statesmen. Mr. Fox, as the common friend to the permanent union and mutual harmony of both countries, sacrifices, in some measure, his own sentiment to this grand Object. Holding to the last, like every other Englishman partial to the glory of his Country, the fond idea of its imperial supremacy, he notwithstanding feels, that there are seasons of difficulty and danger in which principle should be resigned to public good—and, under this conviction, he surrenders his own to that trying occasion, in the clearest, most unequivocal, and decided manner. Mr. Pitt, on his part, concurs with Parliament in conceding our independence; but from that moment he meditates some deep design that our triumph may not be perpetual. He assumes the character of a dark and subtle negotiator, presenting to us the fairest fruits of commerce, which were not only rotten but poisonous at heart.—*Had we, in evil hour, but touched, Liberty, through all her reign, had sighed, and given signs that all was lost.* Do I here speak the language of a partial Individual? Or is it the voice of the nation, uttered from every quarter against that execrable system? Will any Irishman ever forget or forgive the memorable Fourth and Fifth Propositions? When he can, it may be pronounced a fatal symptom of constitutional decay. This argument therefore, is not mine—it is the argument of the People—it is the matter of their innumerable addresses upon that important subject—and as the rise and progress of that deadly negotiation excited a general alarm, so its entire defeat spread an universal joy through the kingdom.

But surely the Commercial System must satisfy the most obstinate credulity, that Mr. Pitt wished to establish the legislative supremacy of Great Britain, at least as to external objects of legislation. By that system we were bound, blindly to adopt the
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future maritime laws, and external commercial regulations of Great-Britain;—so that the true difference between Mr. Fox and Mr. Pitt on this head is, that the former when the question was *fairly at issue* between the nations, openly fought to retain a portion of legislative supremacy, necessary, in his opinion, to the dignity and energy of the British Empire;—the latter sought insidiously to resume the same, after it had been surrendered upon full discussion, and secured to us by the most solemn public engagements—and this, by a measure which would have slandered our title to what remained of our constitutional rights. For, had the nation submitted to a parliamentary surrender of any part of our legislative Independence, so recently after it had been vindicated, it might well be contended at no very distant day, that there was nothing in our late glorious Revolution, partaking of the nature of an original settlement. No solemn contract between the People and Government;—between Nation and Nation—that what was in part revoked was in the whole revocable. If this measure failed to subject our Parliament to that of Great-Britain, it would at least lay the seeds of an Union of Parliaments. After our Parliament had been accustomed for a few sessions to receive and register the acts of the British legislature, they might think it a splendid attainment, to be allowed to debate in an English Senate, measures, which at home they dared not agitate. It ought never to be forgotten in Ireland, that the leading Men of the present Administration in England urged, in support of the Propositions—that they were a gentle, and gradual preparative to an Union of Parliaments. Against this deadly Measure the Whig Club have solemnly pledged themselves in the following resolution :

“ And we further declare, that as far as in us
 “ lies, we will endeavour to preserve to this Coun-
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“ try in all times to come, a Parliament of her own,
 “ residing within this Realm—and exclusively invest-
 “ ed with all parliamentary privileges and power.”

He little understands the nature of our political connection with Great-Britain, and the sentiments which are entertained, and openly advanced on that head, by men of the greatest influence:—Who does not deem it a great benefit, that many men of rank, talents, character, and parliamentary weight, are expressly pledged to oppose an Union? Of this Resolution the Writer has not deemed it prudent to take the slightest notice. Bold and enterprising as he is, he does not yet venture to recommend an Union--and 'till an Union become popular, he probably thought it suited the panegyrist of Mr. Pitt's administration to be silent on that measure. When we are sufficiently matured for perfect Freedom, by debt and taxes, this precious politician will probably then disclose to us the whole of his mysterious system. He who considered parliamentary corruption and prodigality as a good means of becoming free, will not be inconsistent in stating the death of Parliament to be the birth of Liberty. The public however are not yet ripe enough for such doctrine, while they cannot but suspect that Mr. Pitt, in encreasing the corrupt influence of the Crown in Ireland, in multiplying taxes beyond our strength, in trampling upon the spirit of the nation, by punishing popular meetings arbitrarily, in restraining the Liberty of the Press, by bribing and persecuting printers, in establishing a military Police in part of Ireland, and providing by act of parliament, that he may at pleasure extend it to the whole nation—while in these acts, I say, they must clearly discern Mr. Pitt preparing the way for that favourite measure; they cannot be persuaded by all the rhetorick, or all the sophistry which the treasury can purchase, to look with jealousy or suspicion on a body of men who

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are pledged by the most solemn and sacred ties, to resist it to the utmost.

With all this irrefragable evidence against the principles and conduct of Mr. Pitt, in the administration of Irish affairs, the most unblushing assurance is required for his support. And indeed, I will do the Writer the justice to think that he was fully sensible of this, for not the least allusion to the business appears through his whole Pamphlet.—But I will now ask him, whether he really supposes the conduct of such a Minister not to have laid a very just ground of suspicion for a settled and premeditated plan to sap the liberties of Ireland? Does he really imagine that Mr. Pitt, baffled in his commercial system, which would have negotiated away the independence of our Legislature, has for ever given up his design against our liberties? The Whig Club certainly think not—and I am afraid their opinion on this head is too well justified, both by reasoning on the general principles of human nature, and on the peculiar qualities of Mr. Pitt's mind. Under this full impression of his character, and confirmed by the present scheme of “overwhelming Ireland with expences and consequent debt, in order to the increase of unconstitutional influence in her Parliament, they conceive themselves perfectly authorised in asserting, that they clearly perceive a settled and premeditated plan to sap her liberties.” These are no trivial matters—they are great foundations for public judgment—and till they are removed, it is impossible to form a different decision. The Writer's attempt to execute this undertaking, I shall fairly examine. In the mean time, he will expect that I should take some notice of his heads of invective against Mr. Fox.

I have before said, that they have not, in my opinion any place in the present question—but silence may with this candid gentleman be deemed concession. The reader will therefore excuse a few observations.

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With respect to the Middlesex election; it is a question so deeply involving the rights and privileges of parliament, that I feel myself very incompetent to decide.—However, if my opinion were required, I am rather inclined to believe Mr. Fox not right in that business. But surely if Mr. Fox was wrong in the Middlesex election, Mr. Pitt was at least equally so in that of Westminster. His principle went so far as to enable any returning officer to exclude from parliament any man he thought proper, during the indefinite time of *settling his conscience*. I need not insist upon the various mischiefs with which this most unconstitutional doctrine is pregnant. It is sufficient to observe that England at length became fully sensible of its monstrous iniquity; the Minister was obliged to give it up, and the High Bailiff, cast in a court of law for his illegal conduct, paid damages to the amount of two thousand pounds.

The coalition between Mr. Fox and Lord North, was, I am aware, a most unpopular measure—yet I am ready to declare that it never appeared to me in the flagrant light in which the Writer would represent it. There were three great parties in England at that time so balanced, that any two, uniting their forces, overmatched the third. In this pressing emergency, Mr. Fox probably weighed in his mind rather the characters, than the popularity of the remaining leaders. He considered which of them was possessed of more real honour, and of a more accommodating mind. This I say, is very probable, because a statesman, bent upon great designs, would naturally avoid a man upon whom he could not rely with full trust, or whose overweening confidence might lead him to reject all measures but his own. If it be said that public principle ought in such cases to be the bond of union: I readily embrace this doctrine—and I am firmly per-

suaded that, (excepting the principles of the American war, which could never more have operation.) Mr. Fox thought Lord North to be infinitely a more honest statesman and more true friend to England than Lord Shelburne. In this nobleman, I know, he never entertained a very high confidence—and he foresaw that an administration formed by their union, would have been followed by suspicion, intrigue, and perhaps treachery. That the motives here assigned had some share at least, in determining his choice, seems evident from the progress of affairs. Lord North, through every part of his conduct, displays a clear and unimpeached honour, and amply justifies that sentiment of Mr. Fox;—and as to his public motives, the generosity, with which he resigned all views of private ambition to the settlement of the nation, bespeaks a mind truly noble; and shewed, on that occasion, an unassuming opinion of his personal merits, and a disinterested principle of public virtue. Let it be considered too, that Mr. Fox did not sacrifice to that coalition any one of those great principles or national objects, which had rendered him the idol of the people. And although he must feel the unkind return made by a people, whose battles he had fought, and whose dignity he had upheld, through a long course of public service; yet, I firmly believe, he still holds their rights dear, and bends the force of his great mind to establish their full security. But if the co-operation of men, who have disagreed upon some grand public questions, be a crime so unpardonable, the Writer ought to have given us some defence for his own favourites. They have not disdained to act with the most dangerous junto ever known in England—a set of men, whose whole lives have been employed to extend a corrupt influence of the Crown, and who were, in truth, the main springs of that ruinous contest with America.

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The next head of his invective is Mr. Fox's India Bill; and of this, I am not afraid to avow myself the warmest admirer; I consider the measure as replete with wisdom, justice and humanity—calculated to give immediate, and effectual relief to oppressed millions, and a glorious, though, unsuccessful effort, to redeem the national character of England from eternal infamy and ruin. A cry, indeed, has been raised against it, upon grounds of specious justice and popularity—the violation of charters, and encroachment on the prerogatives of the crown, for the purpose of increasing ministerial influence. As to the first, I hold charters as sacred as any man—but there are principles which I hold more sacred—the laws of God and Nature, which have a paramount controul over these, and all other human institutions. When, therefore, a trading Company forget the peaceful design of their original establishment, and affect, rather a spirit of conquest, than of commerce—when their servants securely exercise an uniform system of fraud, and outrage and rapine, against the unhappy natives of the land cursed with their settlement—when those servants, by their influence acquire a dominion over their masters—by their vast distance elude the force of law—and, by their accumulation of wealth, corrupt the grand inquest of the nation;—and when all this tissue of cruelty, robbery and wrong, has made the name of Englishmen a bye-word, and reproach among the nations of the Eastern world---is it a time for a statesman to look into deeds of settlement with the eyes of a special pleader? No; the welfare and honour of the country called for a complete and radical cure.

It is not to our present purpose, to examine Mr. Pitt's India Bill, which itself is liable to the objections of violated charters and improper influence; differing from the former only in this, that in one
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the influence was placed in the hands of the Crown, in the other, in the hands of the Parliament. The conduct of the two statesmen differed, indeed, in one essential point, suitably to their respective natures.—Mr. Fox laid his whole design open to view—Mr. Pitt carried his point, by a most disingenuous artifice—and all men of honour exclaimed against his Declaratory Law, upon that subject. Neither can I perceive any force in the other objection of encroachment on prerogative, for the purpose of increasing ministerial influence. The Minister of the day must necessarily acquire influence, by the creation of new offices, whether these be in the appointment of the Crown or the Parliament; and, however I might in general approve the maxim of deriving commissions under the Crown, it does not appear to me the least encroachment upon prerogative, that Parliament, should, upon great emergencies of state, appoint their own Commissioners, for a limited time, sufficient to attain their object; especially, as such may be rendered more fairly, fully, and strictly accountable.

The fourth head of his invective I have already examined, and come now to his charge upon Mr. Fox's conduct in the Regency. He ascribes his impatient ardour on that occasion, to the hastiness of his ambition, and his eagerness for immediate power. My judgment is different—I feel the great ruling motive of his conduct to have been, a sense of duty and affection to his Prince—to whose rights, he apprehended some danger, from that Minister, who afterwards asserted, that any subject of England had an equal right to the Regency, with the Prince of Wales. If the simplicity of my opinion should raise a smile in the Gentleman, I can very easily forgive it—he knows not the feelings of a sensible and noble mind, which is peculiarly honoured by the esteem and love of his Prince. As to Mr. Fox's doctrine, had it been fairly stated, and clearly

clearly understood, I think so great a clamour would not have been raised about it. I conceive it to be simply this—that in case of incapacity in the King, (which fact should be decided by the Lords and Commons of England) the Prince of Wales, arrived at maturity of years and judgment, and not labouring under any legal disqualification, had, (by the principles of hereditary monarchy, transmitted by usage from our ancestors, and completely ascertained by law, at the Revolution) the undoubted right to be invested with the Supreme Power, during such incapacity; at the same time, however, that he could not proceed to the exercise of that power, without the recognition of the Lords and Commons. He never denied to the two Houses, a judicial authority in this case, neither did he deny their power of guarding the safety of the King, and of providing for his re-establishment on his throne, when God should enable him to govern his kingdom. The doctrine here advanced, he defended upon the principles of hereditary succession.—The Brunswick line he conceives to be seated on the throne of these kingdoms, by decrees which he wishes may be eternal; and which he deems irrevocable, except through their own misconduct or incapacity, during the existence of our present happy Constitution.—To set up therefore a supreme Magistrate against the Heir Apparent, if able to wield the sceptre, he argued, was an unconstitutional assumption, tending to unsettle the Crown, and to raise disorders and commotions in the State. Most members of the Whig Club, are, I believe, of a different sentiment, and maintain the sole competency of the two remaining branches, to supply an occasional deficiency in the third estate. But it never was understood by any body living but the Writer, that they had pledged themselves to every political sentiment of any man, or any party; which is giving to their Declaration
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a most unfair latitude; and after all, their difference with Mr. Fox, is merely upon the abstract question of right; they agree in the two main points of practice, viz. proceeding by way of address, and the appointment of the Prince of Wales, without doubt or competition.

It is time that I now entreat the reader's forgiveness for detaining him so long upon matters wholly irrelevant to the question—but the enemy challenged me into this ground and it was necessary to follow him. As a public Writer he had a sort of privilege to use licentious language towards an English party for the purpose of blackening the Whig Club—whether as a man of private honour he chose this ground with perfect judgment, he can best decide.

But to return from this long digression. The Writer now proceeds to make a direct attack against the Declarations and Resolutions of the Whig Club itself: and his first observation is as follows. “To maintain that the means of sapping the liberties of Ireland is to overwhelm her with expences and consequent debt, was left for the superior sagacity of the Whig Club.” When I first read this paragraph, I really thought it one of his delicate sarcasms, as if the Whig Club, had with great affectation of pomp and solemnity asserted a proposition acknowledged by the whole world. But to my utter astonishment I soon found it to be a serious and sober rejection of the principle as utterly false, and as he says, to be found only in minds under the dominion of prejudice and passion. When a man is under a corrupt influence, he can advance doctrines that outrage all decorum as well as common sense. That the Writer should wish to reconcile the minds of the people to a ruinous accumulation of debt and a profligate waste of public money, is not at all surprising; because he not only thus furthers
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the design of his employers, but also naturally expects a share of the spoils.

But such doctrines I think ought not to be advanced, so as to offer a gross insult to our understanding.

The causes which he assigns for the Revolution, in England and Ireland are utterly groundless and absurd. That under Charles the First was by no means owing to public debt and public distresses—it arose from an attempt, without any pressing urgency, on the part of the Crown, to raise money without consent of Parliament, and was conducted by a nation neither overwhelmed with debt nor exhausted of resources. And as to our successful demand of a Free Trade, in 1779, it ought to be attributed to the fortunate conjuncture of affairs, which obliged England to entertain the claims of a country reduced to desperation. See how well the doctrine advanced by him on this occasion agrees with another which we read in *p.* 18. of his Pamphlet. Here every thing is obtained by exhaustion and beggary—there by strength and vigour. “Ireland,” says he, “in a moment of *strength*, protests against the “usurpation of the British Parliament, and the “tyranny of the Council Boards: and at once demands and obtains the redress of her grievances. If it were necessary, obvious reasons might be given for the French Revolution very different from these which he has assigned. The Writer has in this argument either mistated facts, or traced events to mere accidental circumstances which accompanied their true causes. He has attempted a miserable fallacy for the purpose of soothing the people into an utter inattention to all matters of economy—he makes Corruption and Prodigality the handmaids of Freedom; and represents the Constitution as rising more beautiful and glorious from its own ashes. Such are the wise maxims of his policy; in short,
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they seem to be all contained in the old Proverb, "*When things are at the worst they'll mend.*" He must have studied under an extravagant comedian in this country, who used to swear that his family affairs never had been in good condition, till he got over head and ears in debt. It is not necessary to press this matter further. The intention of the Writer, and the designs of the administration which he supports, are too visible to require illustration—and certainly, if any thing were wanting, this argument alone would strongly evince a settled and premeditated plan to sap the liberties of Ireland.

So much for his reflections on the preamble, which equally display the gentleman, the man of sense and the patriot. Let us now examine his comments upon the Resolutions.

The objects of the two first, he admits to be of great importance—and he brings those forward, merely with an intent to shew, that many principal men in the Whig Club have departed from their true spirit. With this view, he insists so much upon the inseparable connection of the Crowns of England and Ireland, and upon what he calls—the distinguishing characters of the Irish Revolution in 1782. I beg leave to examine these two particulars so far as they can be concerned in the appointment of our Regent.

The united Crowns of these countries, I hope, the Gentleman will acknowledge to be, by common law and constitutional custom, hereditary. Mr. Justice Blackstone maintains, that from the days of Egbert, the first sole Monarch of England, even to the present time, the Crown of England never lost its descendable quality. And every act of recognition on the part of Ireland, previous to the Revolution of 1688, acknowledges the Kings of England to be Kings of Ireland, clearly upon the ground of inheritance. At the Revolution, the line of suc-
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cession was, by the malversation of the Monarch, altered—yet, even on that occasion, we observe a close adherence to the same principle, as far as circumstances could possibly admit—England, in her Act of Settlement, provided in the first place for the issue of William and Mary, and then for the issue of Mary—upon failure of such issue, it was limited to the Princess Anne, James's second daughter and her issue—and lastly, in failure of that, to the issue of King William, who was the grandson of Charles the First, and nephew as well as son-in-law to James the Second. So that the true idea of the monarchy, and of course the connection of the two Crowns, constantly presupposes hereditary right, as the first foundation—and the act of recognition by Ireland in the year 1692, has a clear and indisputable reference to the English act of settlement upon William and Mary, and must be construed by its limitations. The inference which I would draw is plainly this, that the primary obligation of each country is, to maintain the constitutional succession, and not to suffer any compact, grounded upon this idea, to defeat the fundamental principle itself. When, therefore, any man tells me, that the Regent of England ought, by the laws which unite the Crowns, to be Regent of Ireland; I will answer, that by the doctrine of constitutional succession, which has governed the laws, and been written in legible characters for a thousand years—the Heir Apparent, at years of maturity, ought, in case of the King's incapacity, to be acknowledged Regent. I am not now contending for the right of the Prince, in such a situation of affairs; but I argue, that, if the construction of an act of Parliament, which provides only for the care of the *Crown*, be extended to the *Regency*, I am equally authorised to maintain the point of hereditary right, which is an essential ingredient in that very act. The recognition, there-

fore, of the English Regent, upon the grounds of the Revolution in 1692, could no further be binding on Ireland, than as that Regent should be appointed according to the act of settlement in England, that is, as the line of succession should be observed. Either, therefore, there was no analogy between the cases, or if there were, a superior obligation would lye both upon England and Ireland to regard the order of settlement.

The Lords and Commons of Ireland, indeed, considered the case, as having no provision made for it in the laws and statutes of the realm; in which opinion, they had the example of the English Parliament: and, therefore, as the Representatives of an independent nation, they felt a clear and indisputable right to provide for the emergency. That no other power on earth could constitutionally do this, but a Parliament, of which they were branches, was acknowledged in terms, even by the enemies of their proceedings—and, therefore, the whole question, in point of *right*, will turn upon the constitutional propriety of effecting their purpose, by way of Bill or of Address.

And here I would intreat the reader's particular attention, because the Whig Club lye under the foul aspersions of having ascribed certain doctrines to Lord Fitzgibbon, falsely and injuriously: The dignity, with which this Nobleman presides in the First Court of Justice, entitles him to every due mark of veneration, and we cannot better shew this, than by stating the grounds, upon which those opinions were imputed to him.—The Lord Chancellor's argument, appeared to me plainly as follows: "Do not proceed by way of Address, but
 " by the complete form of Bill; and, that you may
 " be enabled to do so, wait for the appointment of
 " the English Regent, who will have possession of
 " the Great Seal of England, and can affix it to
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“ your bill; after which, it may be returned into
 “ Ireland, and receive the assent of the Third
 “ Estate, through the Viceroy, or commission under
 “ the English Regent.” I am sure my intention is
 to state fairly and candidly; and, if I can trust my
 memory in any thing, I may in this, for he often
 repeated his doctrine upon this point. Now, I
 say, that in my mind, this amounts fully to the
 matter declared in the Resolutions; for the Regent
 appointed by the English Parliament, is here fully
 maintained to have the constitutional power of
 affixing the Great Seal of England, to an Irish act,
 and of completing it into a law by his Viceroy,
 that very act, which is to be the medium of ap-
 pointing him Regent of Ireland; so that undoubt-
 edly, he exercises the functions of the supreme exe-
 cutive power of Ireland, before he is legally invested
 by our Parliament. Upon the same ground, the
 Regent certainly legislates in this country, as Regent
 of Great Britain; for in that capacity, and that
 alone, he assents to the Bill, which makes him
 Regent of Ireland; and, also, the Great Seal of
 another country is thus set up for the Imperial
 Crown of this realm; because it is employed, not
 as an evidence, certifying our bills to have been
 submitted to our own Regent, but as a main part of
 their essence, under the authority of the Regent of
 Great Britain. If I mistake not too, his Lordship,
 in the course of his argument, attempted to shew
 the advantage which we might have over England,
 in the simplicity of our proceedings upon that
 question; for that she was obliged to create a Third
 Estate, for the purpose of completing the Regency
 bill; whereas, Ireland, by waiting a little while,
 might find one ready made to her hand. In short,
 the whole tenor of his doctrine, upon this subject,
 left not the least room in my mind, to doubt, that
 the Regent, appointed by the British Parliament,
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could, according to his idea, constitutionally perfect the Irish Bill. And let us see, whether the defence set up, does not substantiate the charges.— Lord Fitzgibbon, soundly and constitutionally argued, “that whenever a Regent was appointed by England, that Regent had alone the power of affixing the Great Seal of England to Irish bills.” That by the statutes of Ireland, “no law could pass, to which the Great Seal of England was not affixed, &c. &c.” This then is my argument—By his Lordship’s doctrine, an Irish Regent cannot be appointed, but by Irish law; the Irish law cannot pass, without having affixed to it the Great Seal of England; the Great Seal of England can be affixed by the English Regent alone; and this Regent can be appointed by no power on earth, but the British Parliament. It follows, of necessity, that the British Parliament has created an organ, essentially necessary to the passing of an Irish act of Regency, *i. e.* that “it had, in the appointment of a Regent over this realm, a legislative authority.” Again, Lord Fitzgibbon argued, “that whenever his Majesty uses the Great Seal of England, he uses it as King of England, and “whenever he employs the Great Seal of Ireland, “he employs it as King of Ireland.” Now, the Great Seal of England, being, according to his Lordship’s doctrine, an essential ingredient in every Irish law, and his Majesty, according to the Writer’s admission, using the Great Seal of England, in the sole capacity of King of England—it follows, that his Majesty, in so affixing his Great Seal of England, “legislates in Ireland as King of Great Britain!”

Lastly, “he never denied the legislative capacity of the King of Ireland,” but he argued, “that the exercise of this capacity was delegated to his Viceroy, who gives the royal assent, for the King of Ireland, to Irish bills in the Irish Parliament.”

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Now, I argue thus:—It is impossible by his Lordship's doctrine, for any Irish bill, to receive the royal assent of the King of Ireland, without having the Great Seal of England affixed to it; wherefore the Great Seal of England is thus made the *sine qua non*, the necessary foundation and superseding principle, and is thus "set up as a substitute for the Imperial Crown of this realm."

There is one manifest error running through his whole defence, he confounds *possession* with *right*; for it by no means follows, that, because the English Regent is alone possessed of the Great Seal, he has therefore a constitutional right of employing it. This is a doctrine similar to one which has eternally ruined the fame of another Law Lord, who advanced in Parliament, that *power confers right*. The Writer's attempt, therefore, to explain away the doctrines, is only a full confirmation of them, and every man of common sense must see, that the Regency bill, as proposed by Lord Fitzgibbon, did involve, in its very frame and constitution, the three great points set forth in the resolutions and reasons of the Whig Club.

Whatever was the Chancellor's motive, for proceeding in the first instance by way of Bill, it was this which led him into all these consequences; and they might have been easily avoided by another form;—he might have urged the necessity of delay, till a Regent of England should be appointed, lest a difficulty might arise from the two countries choosing different Regents, then proposed an Address to the Regent of England, that he would take upon him the executive power of this country, during his Majesty's indisposition; by which Address, he would acquire a capacity of setting the Great Seal of England, in his possession, to an act of Regency, if such were thought necessary. This would have been

been conformable to the conduct of England, at the Revolution of 1688; and, while it provided for an unity in the executive, would at the same time have maintained the independence of our legislature. I have already had occasion to express my sense of that part of Mr. Yelverton's act, which required the Great Seal of England to certify Irish bills; the intention of the framer of that act, and the true spirit of the constitution, which was then forming, undoubtedly were, to obtain evidence that our bills had been submitted to our own King. The Great Seal, which, at the time of making the act, was considered as the best and most solemn evidence, went to nothing more; it was designed as a satisfaction to this country, not an acknowledgment of supremacy in England. When, therefore, unforeseen circumstances should arise, which might render it impossible to maintain this *form*, consistently with the *essence* of our independent legislature; the form, of course, would vanish, and the nation vindicate her substantial rights. That this was Mr. Yelverton's idea, appears not only from the leading character of the times, but also from the relation of the two countries already established. The unity of the crowns had been recognized and universally embraced; nor was any one act of annexation, in the least degree affected by the Revolution of 1782; the Lord Chancellor's construction, therefore, would have been utterly superfluous. Upon the whole, the Great Seal, being merely a sign, employed on account of our Monarch's residence in another country, ought not to be set up as an essential ingredient in an Irish law; and if it be, so far forth, the King of England legislates as such for Ireland.

With respect to the point of *right*, therefore, the Lords and Commons of Ireland are perfectly justifiable, and as a measure of *expediency*, in my opinion, they acted very wisely; there was the highest
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moral certainty, that England would appoint the Prince of Wales—no danger then could be apprehended from their anticipation; and, (what was of vast importance) Ireland, by her act, shewed to England the necessity of regarding fundamental principles, common to both countries, in all cases of mutual respect, which were unprovided for by law.

As to the censure upon Lord Buckingham, the reasons for it are too universally known and acknowledged, to require further explanation; his answer unquestionably carried an intentional insult against the Lords and Commons had it been of doubtful construction, the character of the man would have been an ample comment, but it was clearly designed and never disavowed.—So, peace be with his proud and fullen shade!

Having, I hope, asserted the principles and resolutions of the Whig Club, I am now called upon to support the measures, which it has in contemplation; these are contained in the assertions and reasons subjoined to their resolutions.

The Pension Bill is the first that occurs;—and here the ingenious Writer contrives to establish a conclusion, which violates the common sense of duller reasoners. As in the former part of his pamphlet, he fixed the blessings of Liberty upon the ruins of public credit; so now he proves a clear intention of squandering public money, from an obvious plan of retrenchment. The Pension Bill, at present, stands in this kingdom, at the enormous amount of £.100,000. But what is that to the purpose? Is it not better to leave it to the direction of our gracious Monarch, than to give parliamentary sanction to a fund of £.80,000; which, however small, compared with the present establishment, must be very dangerous, thus settled upon the Minister? Why will you attempt to invade the prerogative,

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which never lavishes its bounty upon the unworthy, and trust to the direction of "complaisant majorities!" How amiable this attention to the purity of Parliament! Surely, the Gentleman must have had an *intimate acquaintance with parliamentary feelings*, and the country never can be sufficiently grateful, for his vigilance over the integrity of its representatives.

"What again," says this candid Writer, "would be the advantage of limiting the number of Placemen to sit in Parliament, while the number of Places continue the same? The influence would merely work in a more secret channel." Honourable man! what a fair and open countenance he gives corruption? There is a peculiar refinement in his reasoning here, which persons unacquainted with the virtues of those Placemen, may not quickly understand. We learn from this great Master of political intrigue, that a Placeman is equally devoted to the interest of his friend or dependant, as to his own—or, if there should be a division of the spoils, that he will condescend to do the public service at a lower price—or that he will devise some means to render his place, which he holds by proxy, equally productive with its present amount. In short, the drama of Government will just go in the same way when the actors are moved by those secret springs behind the curtain, as if they themselves possessed the animating principle—but the nation will have more satisfaction for its money in seeing the play than the puppet-show.

The next measure, which he dispatches by a single stroke, is the Bill for disqualifying Revenue Officers. "Would you deprive innocent men of their legal birth-right, or purchased franchises, without the slightest proof, or charge of criminality?" Some indeed pretend to say, that such deprivation would be of material service to them—
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for that at present they are exposed to a multitude of inconveniencies—driven up and down the country to every place where they are *free*—and using their franchises as badges of slavery. But all this is utterly false. I dare say, their good Lords, the Commissioners, could easily prevail upon every man of them to remonstrate against the cruelty of the measure—and, who can pretend to be so good a judge, whether a man be really free and loves his freedom, as he himself is? This argument from the feelings of a Revenue Officer, I take to be unanswerable.

There is another argument, which as it goes to reprobate all those three measures, and must be conclusive with every true Irishman, I wonder the Writer omits. They have been all passed in the Parliament of England—they ought, therefore, to be rejected here; in order to prove the independence of our legislature.

Such are the shallow impositions attempted upon the public judgment—but the people of Ireland are not, I trust in God, altogether so gross and dull of understanding, as to surrender important national objects to the specious arts of a Court Impostor.—The Whig Club by no means pretend that the Bills in question accomplish every purpose of economy and constitution.—Works of this nature, must necessarily be gradual and progressive—but it is a great matter to lay some foundation—and the objects of those Bills, so far as they go, would produce a very considerable reform. The Pension Bill would reduce, within some reasonable limits, that scandalous prodigality and *illimitable waste*, a detail of which the most hardened servants of Government are ashamed to defend—it would relieve the nation, groaning under her intolerable burdens, by a saving of at least 20,000*l.* a year, and if the present spirit should continue, of much more—it would establish

a noble fund for the reward of merit, while it corrected the flagrant abuses of royal bounty.—In extraordinary cases, the claimant, who had done good service to the state, would have the prize of his valour, or his wisdom, or his integrity, exalted by the gratitude of Parliament, and the acclamations of the people; at the same time, the man, who could advance no such claims, but whose merit perhaps consisted in bringing forward measures destructive of our liberties, would not appear on the list, at once to oppress and insult the nation. Such a Bill would also put a stop to the iniquitous jobbing that has of late prevailed, and grown to so great a pitch; whereby a transfer of pensions is purchased as a transfer of stock: and the establishment continually loaded, not only with new incumbrances, but also by substituting the vigorous and healthy in the room of those who are old and decaying—in short, the benefits of the Pension Bill are so numerous and striking, and the objections to it so few and silly, that in all the debates upon this question, the ablest servants of the Crown had no better arguments to advance, than the miserable fallacy employed by the Writer.

Again, a Place Bill appears to me a measure of Constitution, essentially necessary. The ablest writers upon the English Constitution consider an uncontrouled influence of the third estate over the two remaining branches, as having the most fatal tendency; and they conjecture, that the corruption so engendered, and aided by a general depravity of morals, will, at last, undermine the noble fabric. And, indeed, it is clear to reason—nor can there be conceived a greater solecism in politics, than to mix vast troops of Crown-mercenaries among those bodies, whose principal designation is to oppose all unwarrantable strides of power and prerogative.

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The influence of the Crown, even in England, which enjoys the advantage of such a law as we now speak of, is held by all sound friends of Liberty to have increased beyond its just measure—and in this country every body knows, that the Minister can command great and decided majorities in Parliament upon the most unpopular questions.—No man will have the confidence to deny that Places and Pensions are the main securities of his power. Even the Writer himself neither attempts to question this fact, nor dares avow an opinion, that this influence is sufficiently moderate. He only fears that, if we should attempt to correct this shameful abuse, by a Place Bill, we should encrease the evil. This, however, appears to me a manifest violation of all common sense, and for these reasons:—because the proposed measure in the first place would be most likely to diminish the quantity of influence; for one of its immediate effects certainly would be, to lessen the number of places, many of which have been created for the sole purpose of gratifying the parliamentary friends of Government—in the next place, and in confirmation of the former, because no man can be supposed willing to go so great lengths, and make so great sacrifices of character, for the convenience of a dependant, as for his own—and lastly, because, if any collusion should be apprehended between the nominal Placeman and the Members through whose influence he has obtained his Place, Parliament are competent and bound in duty to make ample provision for such cases. It is only trifling with our understandings, first to conjure up imaginary evils, and then to suppose these out of the reach of human wisdom.

The object of the third Bill, viz. “for disqualifying Revenue Officers,” is the freedom of election.—The want of a Place Bill countenances a spreading corruption in the representative body—
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want of Bills, like this, in their principle, taints the fountain of Representation itself. The objection set up as it were on behalf of this body of men is very silly indeed. For were the case, as this objection would have us think—were these men really aggrieved, instead of being served by such a Bill, yet, when it is palpable to the whole world, that thro' their persons a most unconstitutional influence of the Crown has made its way into all popular elections, is it not time for Parliament to interpose? Will the Writer have the front to deny the fact here stated? or will he maintain it not to be a public evil? or being admitted such, will he allow no remedy to the constitution? I have ever understood it to be a principle of sound policy, that the private interests of individuals, and of particular bodies of men, should yield to the supreme cause of the public weal: particularly if they should be found to militate against great and fundamental truths. Parliament, we know possesses, and has exercised a right of disfranchising entire corporations, when their conduct has declared a corrupt influence. England, we also know, holds the Revenue to be so suspicious a branch of government, as to disqualify even its Commissioners, men probably of high rank, and liberal educations, from a seat in her Senate. And with much better reason, surely, ought men of that order of which we now speak;—men whose very life depends upon the breath of the minister, to be prevented from assuming the dignified name and character of FREE ELECTORS.—I will only add, that when the Writer states the effect of such a bill to be, merely—"the transfer of influence in one or two boroughs from one family to another," he confounds its accidental operation with its essential objects.

The Police bill, becomes now the subject of his vindication, or rather panegyric—I need not pursue

sue him through all the scenes of riot, disorder and outrage, which the city had, according to him, suffered before this salutary law. It is neither my design, nor my wish, to evade any fact, and I am free to own, that the Police of the city required much correction. But, to use the Writer's own expression, "the abuse of management is an argument to reform, not to abolish a system"—and I maintain, that an establishment might have been formed, upon grounds purely civil, less expensive, more effectual, and more constitutional, than the present. Two of these positions are indirectly confessed by the Gentleman himself. "This establishment," says he, "certainly gave influence to Government, and increased the charge on the citizens;" and the third cannot be denied, unless we suppose it impossible, that any officers, but those of the Crown, can do their duty; and that neither the authority of Parliament, nor of law, can enforce good conduct upon public servants. If the former establishment, admitted flagrant offences against the public peace, the latter was itself the active cause of them—and, as, by due amendments, the abuses of one, were, in some measure, corrected; so a proper modelling and careful management, would, beyond all doubt, have given complete efficiency to the other. Public security was therefore by no means the object of the bill; for this could have been much better attained, and upon easier terms. The corrupt influence of the Crown over this great metropolis was its true design—and, I wish a remark, made by the Writer, may not in this view of the subject, prove too well-founded—"This bill," says he, "with all its sins upon its head, has absolutely changed the face of the metropolis." While the pulse of Freedom beat high and strong in the heart of the State, Government was sensible, that it would course with
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the same vigour through the whole system; this noble and vital part, therefore, was the fittest subject of their deadly politics—and they succeeded too well;—the measure has created a corrupt and inordinate influence in the city, for which the citizens are heavily taxed. I have heard it said, (I know not how truly) that certain criminals are obliged to pay the officers of justice, who inflict on them the sentence of the law. The city of Dublin is treated like those criminals—her rights are invaded, her constitution smitten, and her feelings insulted by an establishment, which, at the same time, exhausts her purse. Would any Minister, I ask, have ever dared to propose such a measure in the English Parliament, for the metropolis of that kingdom? I shall be told, perhaps, that it is inconsistent with the charter of London, which is its pride and glory—I know it, and our pride should be, to emulate the principles of that great charter, as far as possible.

But some strong measure was necessary in a city, abounding with dangerous mobs, who are “ready at the sound of a bell, the summons of a hand-bill, or for a given price, to destroy a fellow-citizen, demolish a warehouse, or attack the Parliament;” this is the Writer’s character of our people. If it be thought a just ground for an unconstitutional Police bill with us, was it not at least equally necessary in the city of London? For I challenge the Writer, with all his partiality for his native country, to a fair comparison of the public demeanor of both cities. I do not wish to recall the wild and savage outrages of a London mob—but I must say, that the cases to which he alludes, comparatively displayed a wonderful temper and moderation. In truth, a wise and good Minister would never think of applying, to rare and occasional offences of this kind, a desperate and lasting regulation. But I labour this point unnecessarily

cessarily—every man in his right mind, must feel it to be the most shallow of all pretences. The motive insinuated for a repeal of this obnoxious measure, is equally contemptible. He will feel, to his own, and his master's cost, that the Whig Club have other implements of opposition, beside public tumult, and other supporters beside a mob. He will find them supported by a public mind, temperate, but not subdued; ardent, not licentious—they are friends of peace—but it is of that peace, which Cicero so finely describes, *Pax est tranquilla libertas*.—I have only touched upon the principle of the bill—a detail of its matter would furnish abundant objections, both as to economy and constitution; but this is not an occasion for treating that subject at large.

But what objects does this *wise* and *virtuous* politician recommend to the attention of Parliament, in exchange for these “ideal benefits?” He is grieved to think that the Whig Club have suggested “no plan of mutual intercourse; no mitigation of duties; no extension of the navigation act; no encouragement to the productions of our soil, or to the sale of our manufactures.” Here he faintly sketches out the happy features of that lovely offspring of the present administration, the commercial system. These were the precious fruits held out to us in exchange for our Constitution—they ought to be valuable indeed, for they would have cost us an inestimable price.—Let us then briefly examine their merits.

The intercourse between England and Ireland, ought, in my opinion, to be an intercourse of harmony and friendship—a mutual interchange of good offices—a common sentiment and feeling for each others concerns—in short, any thing but negociation. From a recent attempt of this kind, we have escaped by miracle—and it is now the universal idea of our

best statesmen, and most respectable merchants, that the first set of Propositions, which did not affect to meddle with our Constitution, would, as a commercial plan, have proved very pernicious to this country. There is nothing, which a young nation, open and artless and unsuspecting, should be taught more carefully to avoid, than compacts of pretended reciprocal benefits, with an astute veteran in all the arts of negotiation. I hope the Whig Club, will therefore, never recommend, nor the country adopt, any such " plan of mutual intercourse.

The mitigation of duties has a fair sounding title—but what does it promise? High duties are at present laid upon certain articles, imported into England from this country—whereas, the duties upon similar articles imported thence into Ireland are very low—one part of the celebrated commercial system, was a reduction of the higher duties. But what benefit would Ireland derive from hence? England is able at the present standard of low duties, to undersell us in those articles in our own markets—and of course, we could not have a shadow of hope to contend with her at home. And for this mere phantom of commerce, we were called upon for ever to give up protecting duties; which surrender, was made the basis of the whole system. Had there been any kind or fair intention towards Ireland, we should not have been mocked with a plan of mitigating duties, which secured every thing to England, and nothing to Ireland. But " the extension of the navigation act" was an extraordinary boon—for what but the generosity of England could have procured for us equal benefits of trade to her own colonies? Wonderful bounty! We had great probability of conveying by a circuitous trade to England the produce of her own colonies, her almost exclusive property. By means of this property, and her great capital, she is able to sell colony produce to us at an easier rate

rate than we could have it by direct importation—so that this, like other benefits, is merely nominal. The only accidental event, by which we could be served, would be a superfluity of these articles with us and at the same time, a great scarcity of them in England. And for this high privilege, we were to forego all trade with foreign colonies.

His two remaining plans mean nothing but in reference to that dangerous system, which he is evidently desirous to see revived. I cannot, however, help thinking it a very extraordinary expectation, that a body of men, whose very soul is the confidence of the people, should come forward with measures universally and deservedly odious. These obscure allusions to, and commendations of the parts of that system, are a further evidence of an “infamous, a settled, and premeditated plan, to sap the liberties of Ireland.”

With respect to the following assertions of the Whig Club, against Lord Buckingham’s administration, viz.—“A public avowal of the expediency of combating by corruption a constitutional majority in Parliament; the sale of honours, for the purpose of purchasing seats in the Commons for the dependants of Administration; the division of Boards, and augmentation of Salaries, to increase the influence of the Minister; and plans of intimidation, of making Members of Parliament, the *victims of their votes*.” The Writer does not attempt to deny them in point of fact. His only resource here is, to retort similar charges upon the Duke of Portland’s administration—Now, without entering into a defence of every part of that administration, I may boldly affirm one thing, and appeal to the public for its truth. There never was a Viceroy in this country, to whom it is equally indebted, for the appointment of his public officers and servants in Parliament. He was, perhaps, the
only

only man, with whom a firm attachment to the rights of Ireland was a strong recommendation, and who displaced from offices, and banished from his presence, the profligate slave and audacious traitor. Under his government, the people, for the first time, saw an attention paid to their wishes—they were proud of the confidence, which the great assertors of their rights enjoyed with that amiable Viceroy—and the general course of public affairs went on with tranquillity and content. I could name some of the highest offices of State, which were filled at that time, without any view to Parliamentary connection, but, purely for the satisfaction of the public mind. Even the Writer's censures upon the Duke of Portland, do not go to the general principle of his appointments, but only to one or two particular cases—where his private attachments mingled with his public motives. It ought to be considered, however, that in consulting his feelings, he cannot be charged with setting aside any claim of merit.

What then was the difference between the two Viceroys in the exercise of this ministerial prerogative? When the Duke of Portland came to this Kingdom, he looked to the support of those men, who had been principal instruments in bringing about our glorious Revolution—and he disdained all connection with the advocates for English supremacy. The Marquis of Buckingham maintains the legislative authority of Great-Britain, in appointing an Irish Regent, and threatens such Members of Parliament, as refuse obedience to him, with being made *the victims of their votes*. Is not the former, I ask, a constitutional and noble use of influence, regarding the feelings and honour of the nation? And what is the latter, but an insolent and profligate policy, employing those powers, which are committed for the welfare of the state, to its injury and subversion? Nothing could be more unfavourable to the
 Writer's

Writer's cause than this comparative view of their administration.

My opinion upon the subject of influence is fairly this—every Minister is supposed to employ it towards the execution of his designs, but this necessary evil, arising from the corruptions of men, should be *tolerated only*, not *avowed*: because such a scandalous avowal holds at open defiance all decent respect for public principle—and further, this corrupt influence ought never to be employed in cases, which had not a close connection with the general course of government; upon those grounds, the conduct of Lord Buckingham merited the highest reprobation, he openly threatened Members of Parliament with being made *victims of their votes*; and this in a case, when a question upon the rights of our Constitution accidentally arose.

But it seems “he was exposed to a double fire from “his adversaries; on one side the charge of public „ profusion, on the other, the imputation of private „ treachery.” What an excellent defence! the Writer did not once reflect, that the latter charge cannot hold against the Viceroy, unless in a violation of engagements; nor the former, unless those engagements went to a profligate waste of public money. He had so pledged himself, that to avoid treachery, he must be guilty of profusion.—But what can be meant, he wishes greatly to know, by an adequate responsibility in this country? After playing for a while upon the aristocracy (which has been so useful an instrument in his hands) he supposes, that the Whig Club might allude to the “institution of an Irish „ cabinet.” His dilemma upon this subject is incomparable, and extends its horns to the danger of the English cabinet. Let King be substituted for Viceroy, and his argument applies with equally happy force. His three wise reasons too, for our having “the only responsibility compatible with our situation,”
 prove

prove to the satisfaction of every candid mind, that *the measures can be made responsible for themselves.*—*Measures not men*, is the true maxim of liberal politics.—In truth, his reasonings are not designed to convince a rational understanding.—*But who would throw pearls before swine?* they are good enough for *this blundering country.*

I do not pretend to dictate any plan of responsibility in Ministers ;—but certain it is, that England has an infinite advantage over Ireland in this respect. It has been ever considered, as the great fence against the encroachments of arbitrary power.—This separation of the Minister from the King, and the responsibility attached to his public measures, preserve at once a sacred veneration for Majesty, and a vigilance over the nation's rights. Whether by our constitution a Viceroy can do no wrong, I know not ; but beyond all doubt, they and their Secretaries do a great deal with impunity ; and they are supported in their measures by persons in this kingdom, without the smallest fear or concern. This *fugacious responsibility* is a grievance of the first magnitude—the serpent who bites us slips away—and, while his poison is making head through our frame, he is out of reach, perhaps feasting on our blood.

And now, this famous Tory and I have come to our last match upon the closing assertion of the Whig Club. He stands forth here as the champion for the faith of Government, and boldly strikes at the faith of Parliament.—His master had accused the Lords and Commons of Ireland of illegality in their proceedings :—The slave has improved upon his audacity ; and strongly insinuates against them an intention of fraud. Upon a question of account, he will forgive me, if I state specific charges for general declamation. His method is certainly more suitable to the vivacity of his talents, and the ends he has in
view

view. Truth is my object; and plain facts must supply the want of ingenuity.

It is admitted by him, that Government considered itself as under an obligation to confine its expenses within the grants of the year 1785; and he asks us, whether we are ready to acknowledge that Parliament was bound, that those grants should be received in the treasury net and uncurtailed? I answer him—certainly: And we will examine the question upon the grounds of this reciprocal obligation.

But first I must take notice of his statement of bounties in the year 1784; in which they stood only at 72,000*l.* whereas in 1788, they were so high as 138,000*l.* He has chosen to compare a year of great dearth with a year of plenty, for the purpose of shewing the great increase of bounties. The fair statement should have been between two years in similar circumstances, either both years of dearth, or of plenty. In 1781, for instance, which was a year of plenty, the deficiency of bounties below those of 1788, was but 33,000*l.* I only mention this, lest his general assertion—that the bounties have been “since that period of 1784, annually “double, or more than double,” should mislead.—I now return to the argument.

“When you attack the extravagance of Government,” says he, “since the year 1785, calculate “at the same time, the excess of your bounties since “that period.”—He might have added too, the “the increased expence of management. If the “amount of the excess shall be more than the arrears on the establishments, there can be no accusation at all; if it be less, the difference alone “can constitute the measure of criminality.” I suppose the Writer fairly intends by this, to compare the net revenue, which remains after deducting parliamentary bounties, and expences of collection,
with

with the public expenditure, since the grant of the new taxes in 1785. If he means any thing else, I do not understand him;—nor do I conceive any other mode of proving whether the faith of Parliament has been adhered to, by keeping up the revenue to its stipulated amount, and the faith of Government in equalizing its expences with that income. The terms of this agreement, then, according to his own statement, were that Government engaged, that the expenditure should not exceed the revenue; or in other words—that no new arrears should be found on the establishment. Parliament, on their part, engaged that the Revenue should be increased 140,000*l.* a year, over and above any increase of parliamentary bounty, and any increased expence of management, consequent upon the estimated increase of the Revenue. By these means, the new taxes would come net uncurtailed into the treasury.—Let us then examine the state of the accounts, and see how each party fulfilled its share of the compact.

At Lady-day 1784, the gross revenue amounted to 1,076,758*l.* 17*s.* 9*d.* 7-8; let this be made the standard, as the Writer wishes, to which we shall on one hand, refer the encrease of the revenue, during the three years subsequent to the new taxes; and on the other, the amount of the new taxes, encreased expence of management, and encrease of parliamentary bounties during the same period.—The account, then, stands fairly thus:

Lady-day.	Gross Revenue.			Gross encrease of Revenue.		
	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
1784	1076758	17	9 $\frac{7}{8}$	—	—	—
1786 -	1335692	4	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	—	258933	6 8 $\frac{1}{8}$
1787 -	1278123	0	3 $\frac{1}{4}$	—	201364	2 5 $\frac{9}{16}$
1788 -	1393304	3	0 $\frac{1}{2}$	—	316545	5 2 $\frac{1}{2}$
Total of gross encrease of revenue in 3 years				776842	14	4 $\frac{1}{4}$
				Amount		

Amount of new taxes during 3 years, } 1786, 87, 88. —	£.	s.	d.
Increased expence of management in 1786, } above that in 1784, 29026l. 9s. 8d $\frac{1}{2}$ and allowed for each of 3 years, }	420000	00	0
Increase of parliamentary bounties in 1786, } above these in 1784, }	87079	9	2 $\frac{1}{2}$
Ditto, — 1787, above ditto, —	68951	8	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
Ditto, — 1788, above ditto, —	82285	16	2 $\frac{1}{2}$
	71238	17	8 $\frac{1}{2}$
Total amount of new taxes, increased expence of management, and increase of parliamentary bounties for 3 years, }	729555	3	2
Total of gross revenue in 3 years, —	776842	14	4 $\frac{1}{2}$
Excess of gross revenue above new taxes, increased expence of management, and increase of parliamentary bounties for 3 years, }	47287	3	2

From this statement, it manifestly appears, that, instead of any arrears upon the establishment, at Lady-day, 1780, the sum of 47,287l. 3s. 2d. ought, according to the terms of the above-mentioned stipulation, to have been found in the Treasury.—Parliament has therefore performed its part fully. Now this sum is not only wholly unaccounted for, but also, on that day was incurred, the enormous arrear of 337,424 9s. 3d. upon the establishment; as may be seen from the following *items*:

	£.	s.	d.
Increase in the arrears of establishment in 1786,	106,148	18	10
Do. — — 1787,	180,052	4	0 $\frac{1}{2}$
Do. — — 1788,	51,223	6	1 $\frac{1}{4}$
	£.337,424	9	3

In the account here stated, the expence of management in 1786, viz. * 29,026l. 9s. 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. is sup-

* Of this Sum no more than 25,799l. 17s. 0 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. could possibly be raised in consequence of the stipulated increase of the Revenue.—The rest, viz. 3,226l. 12s. 8 $\frac{1}{4}$ d. was incurred in 1785, without any pretext, and solely by the profusion of Government.

supposed to be a fixed quantity during the three years in question; because there was no stipulated increase of revenue since 1785; and consequently no ground for charging any further increase of management.—In 1787, the gross revenue fell 57,569*l.* 4*s.* 3½*d.* below its amount in 1786; yet the charges of management in 1787 exceeded that in 1786—This, therefore, instead of being a mitigation of the extravagance of government, is only a proof of it.

Indeed it is well known, that under the head of management, public money is as much wasted, and patronage as much increased, as under any other—and this appears most evidently from observing, that tho' in 1786 the expence of management, was increased on pretence of the new taxes, by the unreasonable sum of 25,799*l.* 17*s.* 0½*d.*—yet was the encrease of this expence still further aggravated, amounting in 1787, to 29,014*l.* 3*s.* 11*d.* and in 1788, to 31,682*l.* 7*s.* 10*d.*½.—

SUCH IS THE FAITH OF GOVERNMENT!

I have now gone through the pamphlet, without omitting any thing, which seemed to me of the least importance, with what success, the public will judge—For myself, I will only say, that no one point has been stated or argued by me, but upon the fullest conviction of my heart and understanding.—I have avoided, as much as possible, personal invective, and bold assertion; because I hold them to be weak supporters of a good cause; and the miserable resources of a bad one;—in the present instance, too, I particularly shunned these vices, on account of the striking model, which was constantly before me;—one specimen, alone, may serve to shew into what insufferable nonsense a rage for them sometimes betrays a man.—“I
“need

“ need not repeat” says the Writer, “ that no character of spirit—of experience—of ability, would condescend to a situation so degrading and ignominious;—for the puppet, in such a scene, we must search for some leading Nobleman in the ranks of Whiggism—*whose virtues result from his ignorance—whose consequence is derived from his stupidity*”—the Writer should learn to correct this saucy manner—*petulance is not wit, nor assertion ARGUMENT.*

But I turn away with pleasure from all his sophistry and calumny, to offer some reflexions to my Countrymen, which may be important in the present critical situation of public affairs.

Friends and Countrymen,

IT has been your peculiar and distinguished happiness, to see the day, when your COUNTRY, which had been enslaved in her Constitution, and fettered in her Commerce, become FREE, through a glorious Revolution—without blood. That, under the ruling providence of God, your own spirit was the principal means of bringing about this great event, must naturally inspire you with a virtuous and noble pride—from being an abject and oppressed people, you now hold a rank among the independent nations of the earth, and a character inferior to none in an intrepid, though temperate valour—The riches of the world are open to you—and the British Constitution is your glory.

“As your bold and honourable enterprise has been crowned with success, so it is your high and bounden duty to guard its precious benefits with vigilant care;—all men expect, and posterity demands that you shall transmit those vindicated rights to future ages;—And in order to secure this great object, in the anticipation of which every free and generous heart exults, you must preserve an unremitting attention to the designs of that power, from which you have lately been emancipated:—for, be assured, no nation ever willingly resigned dominion, nor would let slip any plausible occasion to resume its lost authority.

“But, beside this general call of duty upon all countries which have recovered their freedom, you
“lye

" lye under an obligation of singular necessity, to guard
 " your NEW CONSTITUTION. The Minister of
 " these times has already notified his intentions—they
 " were legible in his Commercial System—you there
 " saw, and reprobated an attempt against the INDE-
 " PENDENCE of your LEGISLATURE, an attempt
 " the more wicked, as the way had been most infi-
 " dioussly prepared for it, by a more specious and
 " harmless negotiation.—The CAUSE of Ireland,
 " however conducted and supported by the ARDENT
 " LOVERS OF LIBERTY, was happily once again
 " victorious;—and the Minister, baffled in his design,
 " finds it necessary yet more to corrupt the mind of
 " Parliament, and to subdue the spirit of the nation,
 " before his plans can be matured for execution—
 " Ambition and Revenge conspire, and bear him on
 " to Imperial sway.

" It can hardly be necessary to warn you, that the
 " Commercial System was designed as the foundation
 " of an UNION !—an event, which must for ever
 " blast the rising hopes, and tarnish the splendid glories
 " of Ireland.—This has ever been, and still continues
 " to be, the favourite object of the present Admini-
 " stration—you have hitherto resisted its progress, and
 " I doubt not, you *now* feel a generous indignation
 " against all measures that may have such an object in
 " view.—You fancy it impossible, because the univer-
 " sal sentiment of the nation exclaims against it—Yet
 " let not these imaginations betray you into a false and
 " fatal security; no people in the world are more re-
 " solute in accomplishing an enterprize of immediate
 " and pressing moment—none more apt to lose advan-
 " tageous ground through want of steadiness and
 " perseverance—these are the virtues, which you are
 " now called upon to exert;—and there never was a
 " time,

“ time, when they were more necessary on the one
 “ hand, nor on the other, more likely to have success.

“ Heretofore you have had no formed and regular
 “ system of opposition to the arbitrary designs of a
 “ corrupt Government—no free communication of
 “ public sentiment—no mutual confidence—your
 “ force has been dissipated, and your efforts languid.
 “ Public action demands concentrated powers—and
 “ the flame of Liberty expires, unless caught from
 “ man to man with glowing sympathy.—What avails
 “ a divided service against the embodied troops of
 “ Government? To your own judgment and expe-
 “ rience I appeal, whether these things are not
 “ so?

“ And if these things be so, what more fortu-
 “ nate occasion could be offered to this country,
 “ than an UNION of MEN, avowing great con-
 “ stitutional principles, and pledging themselves,
 “ as men of honour, to the public, for the main-
 “ tainance of them?—A society, whose prime and
 “ grand objects are boldly held forth to be, THE
 “ CONSTITUTION OF THE REALM—THE
 “ SACRED RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE—
 “ THE INDEPENDENCE OF OUR LEGIS-
 “ LATURE, AND THE PRESERVATION
 “ OF OUR OWN PARLIAMENT, now call
 “ upon you for a vigorous support—are these the
 “ principles which you wish to maintain?—Give
 “ your confidence to the men, who in the face of
 “ their country, and the world, are solemnly pledg-
 “ ed to them, and who cannot recede from their
 “ engagements, without everlasting infamy—The
 “ names of CHARLEMONT and GRATTAN alone,
 “ should sanctify this meeting to the people.—Can
 “ you

"you for a moment suppose, that the unsullied
 "purity of the former, which neither Corruption
 "dares approach, nor Calumny impeach—his dig-
 "nified integrity—his noble pride, and his virtuous
 "patriotism, could condescend to factious motives,
 "or to any thing but an unremitting zeal for your
 "welfare and honour?—Or, do you imagine, that
 "the latter will ever lose sight of that indepen-
 "dence, which he built up, and which has been the
 "constant idol of his soul? I might name to you
 "a multitude of others, who, though not equally
 "splendid, are not less attached to your interests—
 "and who led you on with them to freedom and
 "to glory.

"If there be some characters, in whom you can
 "less confide, from a review of their former con-
 "duct, is it a light thing, to engage those by every
 "tie, which private men hold sacred, to the great
 "principles of this union?—Or, can there be a
 "better hope of correcting their errors, than by
 "associating them with your tried friends? The
 "host of Government, has, indeed, no variety of
 "principle—slaves of an imperious master, they all
 "bend one way—and that way tends to sap and
 "undermine your constitution.

"Do not rashly credit base and false suspicions,
 "fabricated by your avowed enemies—try well the
 "merits of this important cause—let the tongue
 "of the nation be set free from that dead silence,
 "which it has been the uniform maxim of the pre-
 "sent Government to impose—the WHIG CLUB
 "call upon you for your constitutional sentiments
 "upon national subjects—and, as they are solicitous
 "to obtain your confidence and approbation, so
 "you

“ you may challenge their protection and support,
 “ against all arbitrary attempts upon your civil
 “ liberties.

“ You are asked, whether this is the critical
 “ moment to diffuse a spirit of suspicion and distrust
 “ in our Sovereign’s government,—when England
 “ has been redeemed from a calamitous war, and
 “ again become flourishing and happy?—I wish
 “ you to rejoice, as I doubt not you do, in the
 “ prosperity of England—May the happiness of
 “ both countries ever be the same; and no rude
 “ hand attempt to break their delicate connection.

“ But, while I applaud those generous feelings,
 “ you must guard against their fond excesses.—A
 “ jealous attention to her growing power ought never
 “ to be banished from your minds: particularly,
 “ while that power is in the hands of a Minister,
 “ who has already displayed so dangerous a charac-
 “ ter;—if he be an able negotiator, you have the
 “ stronger necessity for vigilance and caution;—
 “ foreign treaties are not your concern, but do-
 “ mestic freedom;—so long as you watch over your
 “ liberties, the strength of England is your strength—
 “ the moment you dismiss them from your thoughts,
 “ it becomes your weakness—remember the occa-
 “ sion, which made you FREE—and trust not to
 “ a reverse of fortune, which might make you
 “ SLAVES!”

A W H I G.

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